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Voting Realism
Gilda R. Daniels1
Since Shelby County v. Holder, the country has grown
accustomed to life without the full strength of the Voting Rights
Act. Efforts to restore Section 4 have been met with calls to
ignore race conscious remedies and employ race neutral remedies
for modern day voting rights violations. In this new normal, the
country should adopt “voting realism” as the new approach to
ensuring that law and reality work to address these new
millennium methods of voter discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
The 2016 Presidential election is lining up to be the first without the
protections of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).2 In fact, in
2016, we will witness the first election where United States Attorney General
Loretta Lynch3 will have less power to protect voting rights than Attorney General
Katzenbach4 did in 1965. The Court’s decision in Shelby County5 continues to
1
Gilda R. Daniels is an Associate Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law. She is
also a former Deputy Chief in the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting
Section under both the Clinton and Bush administrations. She has litigated voting rights cases under
the Voting Rights Act, National Voter Registration Act, and other statutes. She would like to thank the
University of Baltimore School of Law for granting her a summer stipend, her colleagues for their
support, and her research assistants, Edward “Ned” Richardson and Ike Mpamaugo. Finally, thanks to
the Kentucky Law Journal and Professor Joshua Douglas.
2
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required covered jurisdictions to submit voting
changes to either the Attorney General of the United States, or the District Court for the District of
Columbia prior to implementation for approval. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5 79
Stat. 437, 439 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2014)). The Supreme Court decision
in Shelby County. v. Holder struck down the coverage formula contained in Section 4 of the Act.
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). Without a coverage formula, covered jurisdictions
under Section 5 do not exist. Accordingly, Section 5 has been rendered obsolete. See id. at 2627.
3
Loretta Lynch serves as the first African American female Attorney General for the United States.
Athena Jones, Loretta Lynch Makes History, CNN (Apr. 27, 2015, 1:27 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/23/politics/loretta-lynch-attorney-general-vote/.
A
monumental
achievement; yet, she has fewer tools at her disposal to address voting discrimination than her esteemed
counterpart of fifty years ago. See Meet the Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/ag/meet-attorney-general (last visited Aug. 24, 2016) for more information
about Ms. Lynch.
4
Nicholas Katzenbach served as United States Attorney General in 1965 at the passage of the
Voting Rights Act. See Statement by Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach before the House
Judiciary Committee on the Proposed
Voting
Rights Act
of 1965 (1965),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/katzenbach/1965/03-18-1965.pdf; see also Attorney General:
Nicholas Debelleville Katzenbach, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/katzenbachnicholas-debelleville (last visited Aug. 22, 2016).
5
Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612.
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have irreparable effects on the right to vote. Prior to the Shelby County decision,
covered jurisdictions across the nation were required to seek approval for changes
that affected the right to vote, such as moving polling places, candidate qualifying,
or congressional redistricting, pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 6 The
breadth of the protection was massive.7 It enabled voters to access the right to vote
and have a level of assurance that the proposed voting practice or procedure has
been subjected to an assessment of whether minority voters would suffer
retrogressive effects.8 The benefits of notice, preclearance, and other prophylactic
measures have been lost.9 We currently live in a world where burdens have shifted;
difficult and costly voting seems to be the new normal.
With Capitol Hill gridlock, many have abandoned a federal solution and look
fervently at state constitutions and legislative bodies to protect the right to vote.
While victories in Pennsylvania and other states 10 could plausibly lead advocates to
this conclusion, this type of piecemeal litigation sets voting rights back half a
century.11 Some members of Congress have attempted to address the void that

6
See, e.g., Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, As
Amended, 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.1–51.67 (2012); Samuel Issacharoff, Essay, Is Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1711 (2004); Michael J. Pitts,

Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to Samuel Issacharoff’s Suggestion to Scuttle
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REV. 605, 629 (2005) (explaining congressional and
statewide redistrictings); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act ,
117 YALE L.J. 174, 199–202 (2007) (arguing that Section 5 deters covered jurisdictions from adopting
overtly discriminatory legislation); Victor Andres Rodrıguez, Comment, Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 After Boerne: The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 769, 806–11
(2003); Glenn Kunkes, Note, The Times, They Are Changing: The VRA Is No Longer Constitutional,
27 J.L. & POL. 357, 373 (2012) (“[T]he first generation barriers of intentional discrimination relied on
by Congress in 1965 to justify Section 5 are the main evidence needed to warrant the retention of the
preclearance obligation.”).
7
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §51.28; Notices of Section 5 Activity Under Voting Rights Act of 1965, As
Amended, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/notices-section-5-activity-under-votingrights-act-1965-amended (last visited Aug. 22, 2016); The Voting Rights Act: Protecting Voters for
Nearly
Five
Decades,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUSTICE
(Aug.
22,
2016),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-act-protecting-voters-nearly-five-decades.
8
See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
9
See, e.g., William Yeomans, et al., The Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014: A Constitutional
Response to Shelby County, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, May 8, 2014,
https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Yeomans_Stephanopoulos_Chin_Bagenstos_and_Daniels__VRAA_1.pdf.
10
See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (ordering
preliminary injunction based on risk of placing undue burdens on the fundamental right to vote);
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2,
2012) (ordering preliminary injunction based on risk of voter disenfranchisement).
11
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 313 (1966) (“The Voting Rights Act was
designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the
electoral process . . . . The Act creates stringent new remedies for voting discrimination . . . and in
addition the statue strengthens existing remedies for pockets of voting discrimination elsewhere in the
country.”).
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Shelby County left through the Voting Rights Amendment Act12 and the Voting
Rights Advancement Act.13 The notice and oversight that Section 5 gave to
millions of citizens and thousands of communities across the country is not an easy
vacuum to fill.
What is left of the Voting Rights Act, and where do we go from here? Must we
abandon the quest for racial equality or hope to achieve this objective through less
overt means? Should we eliminate race conscious legislation and ignore the racially
disparate effects? Is such a task even possible? Scholars have written about
abandoning the race-conscious response embedded in the VRA for a race-neutral
solution.14 Indeed, they have posited that the VRA’s days were numbered, and that
its most effective days are in the past. Moreover, they offer that modern day
controversies are the product of partisan concerns and are not race-related.15
Further, scholars argue that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments16 should
serve as the primary tools used to dismantle voter suppression.17 In fact, years ago, I
wrote an article suggesting that Congress use its Elections Clause power to adopt
Voter Impact Statements as a requirement for passage of voting changes. 18
However, while the Elections Clause continues to serve as a viable option, the
VRA and its “racially aware” components should continue to serve as a basis for
protection. Additionally, though partisanship remains the leading indicator for

12
Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2015, H.R. 885, 114th Cong. (2015); see also Paul Lewis,
Congress Makes Bipartisan Push to Restore Parts of Voting Rights Act , GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2014,

7:24
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/congress-makes-bipartisan-push-torestore-parts-of-voting-rights-act.
13
Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 2867, 114th Cong. (2015); see discussion infra
Part III.
14
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127
HARV. L. REV. 95, 100 (2013) (arguing that the Elections Clause provides an approach that can
“potentially be more effective than the VRA approach”); see also Richard H. Pildes, The Future of
Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 744 (2006).
15
See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Voting Rights Law and Policy in
Transition, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 243 (2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/04/voting-rights-lawand-policy-in-transition/; Jamelle Bouie, Voter ID’s Real Roots: Is it Racism or Hyper-Partisanship?,
SLATE
MAG.
(Oct.
14
2014,
5:39
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/10/voter_id_s_real_roots_is_it_racism_o
r_hyper_partisanship.html.
16
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying “any person within [their] jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment grants the
right to vote to citizens of the United States regardless of “race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” Id. amend. XV, § 1. These amendments give Congress enforcement power through
“appropriate” legislation. Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.
17
Cody Gray, A New Proposal to Address Local Voting Discrimination, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 611,
620–21, 626–27 (2016) (implementing a “fire-alarm” system instead of the current “police-patrol”
method would allow citizens to bring voting rights cases through inter alia, the assistance of local legal
aid offices).
18
Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to Eliminating
Election Administration Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 57, 99–100 (2008) [hereinafter Daniels, A Vote Delayed is a Vote Denied].
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determining whether suppressive voting laws are implemented,19 the racial impact
of these laws cannot be ignored. Moreover, in this new millennium, more than
ever, race is used as a proxy for party.20
This Article suggests that not only should we pursue so-called race neutral
measures, but we must also recognize the need for racially aware legislation that
corrects for past historical discrimination that continues to have contemporaneous
effects on the right to vote. Drawing from two definitions of racial realism,21 this
article contends that in order to address the gap between the racial reality that we
currently live in and the rampant attempts to limit voter access requires a dose of
what I call “voting realism.”22
Voting realism requires (1) acknowledging that race has significance and
usefulness and (2) developing more imagination in how we achieve racial equality.
Voting realism recognizes that race and racism influence the voting process. In fact,
party identification throughout the voting process is often synonymous with race.23
Further, policies that are adopted include this recognition, whether stated or
unstated or whether authorized pursuant to the Elections Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment. Voting realism allows legislators to think imaginatively about what
the laws should be without ignoring the role that racism plays in the process. It
suggests that instead of abandoning racially aware remedies, we should
acknowledge the impact that the existing laws have on racial and ethnic minorities
and their ability to access the ballot to develop laws that address concerns. Voting
realism highlights that race neutral laws can and often do have racial effects and
adversely impact groups that happen to be minority. It has become normative
behavior. However, voting realism offers that racial effects should serve as a key
consideration in any legislation affecting the right to vote. Yet, it also challenges us
to think more imaginatively about restoring Section 4. The answer may well lie
beyond a reboot of the Voting Rights Act or a re-enforcement of the National
Voter Registration Act. Voting realism attempts to envision the possibilities of a
system that is free from race discrimination, yet does the work of mitigating its
influence.
19
See Richard L. Hasen, How to Save the Voting Rights Act, SLATE MAG. (Aug. 4, 2015, 11:04
AM) (“Today, Republicans see the Voting Rights Act as protection for Democrats, not racial
minorities.”),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/08/how_to_save_the_voting_rights_act_
voting_rights_shouldn_t_rely_on_parsing.html.
20
See Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1270, 1279–80 (2015).
21
See infra Part I.
22
Voting realism is offered as a theoretical approach to the current state of voting rights and
hopefully challenges advocates to expand coverages and protections. Admittedly, this approach may
garner more questions than answers, but the framework for achieving a system that protects and
encourages voter participation must yield to a more expansive discussion than race and party.
23
See Frank Newport, Democrats Racially Diverse; Republicans Mostly White, GALLUP (Feb. 8,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160373/democrats-racially-diverse-republicans-mostly-white.aspx.
See generally Chris Tokita, A Glance at Race and Political Affiliation: Independents Represent! , ALL
TRUISMS (June 16, 2015), https://christophertokita.wordpress.com/2015/06/16/a-glance-at-race-andpolitical-affiliation-independents-represent/ (showing racial composition of each political affiliation).
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Part I of this Article explores two very different conceptualizations of racial
realism and offers a perspective for voting. Part II discusses the purpose of the
Voting Rights Act and the impact of Shelby County. Part III explores responses to
Shelby County and describes the racial impact of these measures. Part IV offers a
new approach that I call “voting realism” to serve as a framework for combating
voter discrimination. This approach suggests that the focus should not limit
“remedies” to an either or approach, but begin to think imaginatively about the type
of democracy not only that we currently live in, but the type of democracy we can
aspire to create.24
I. DEFINING VOTING REALISM
With the Shelby County decision, the shifting burdens, the exorbitant costs of
Section 2 litigation, and the abundance of voting law changes, it is easy to become
despondent. Yet, the need continues to develop legal and policy approaches that
continue to fight the good fight against race discrimination in voting. While most
articles discuss whether courts and legislators should embrace party or race, the
Elections Clause, or the Fourteenth Amendment, it becomes possible to ignore the
larger issue of creating a system that allows every American the opportunity to fully
and freely participate in the electoral process.25 Voting realism offers a theoretical
approach for discussion. It suggests that we must acknowledge our present reality.
It adheres to the belief that it is time to think creatively and redefine goals
regarding what it means to have assurances that the right to vote is protected from
discrimination. The approach is loosely derived from two divergent theories
regarding racial realism from Professors Derrick Bell26 and John Skrentny,27 who,
24

Part IV, infra, begins a discussion on an imaginative way to achieve universal
suffrage through passage of a right to vote amendment. This law review article is
not meant to dispositively discuss this often debated issue, but merely to present
it as an example of the type of imaginative thinking that Professor Bell would
endorse.
25
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 Harv. L. Rev. F. 58 (2014).
26
Professor Derrick Bell is considered one of the founders of Critical Race Theory. Scholarship,

DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, http://professorderrickbell.com/scholarship/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
He was the first tenured African American faculty member at Harvard Law School. Fred. A. Bernstein,
Derrick Bell, Law Professor and Rights Advocate, Dies at 80 , N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/us/derrick-bell-pioneering-harvard-law-professor-dies-at80.html?_r=0. He authored several books on the subject. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM
AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2005); DERRICK BELL, FACES
AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (reprint 1993) (1992); DERRICK
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1989).
27
John Skrentny is a professor of sociology and director of the Center for Comparative Immigration
Studies at the University of California, San Diego. Faculty Profiles: John D. Skrentny, U.C. SAN
DIEGO DEP’T SOC., https://sociology.ucsd.edu/people/profiles/faculty/john-skrentny.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2016); Co-Directors and Staff, U.C. SAN DIEGO CTR. FOR COMP. IMMIGR. STUD.,
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despite coining the same phrase of “racial realism,” certainly had different
applications. However, parts of both these theories can assist in developing an
approach to voting rights and the new reality.

A. Imaginative Thinking.
Professor Derrick Bell’s article Racial Realism provided the harsh conclusion
that the quest for racial equality was futile and that racism is permanent.28 Despite
his many contributions to overcome racial discrimination in many areas as an
attorney, law professor, and law school dean, this derogatory proclamation could
leave advocates hopeless. Professor Bell witnessed landmark victories and
debilitating defeats. He offered that despite “herculean efforts . . . . [l]egal
precedents we thought permanent have been overturned, distinguished, or simply
ignored.”29 His position on the permanence of racism has been thoroughly
critiqued.30 He chastises activist reliance on a model of striving towards the goal of
racial equality as elusive.31 He points out that once the overt signs of racial
inequality were removed through the adoption of laws that dismantled Jim Crow
laws, “more subtle” forms of discrimination appeared. 32 Rejecting his position on

http://ccis.ucsd.edu/people/staff/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). He is the author of several
books, on this subject. See, e.g., JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (Belknap Press, 2002); JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1st ed. 1996).
28
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism].
Bell’s core message was as follows:
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail
as successful will produce no more than temporary “peaks of progress,” short-lived victories
that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance.
This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies. We must acknowledge it and move on to
adopt policies based on what I call: “Racial Realism.” This mind-set or philosophy requires us
to acknowledge the permanence of our subordinate status. That acknowledgement enables us
to avoid despair, and frees us to imagine and implement racial strategies that can bring
fulfillment and even triumph.

Id. at 373–74.
29
Id.
30
See, e.g., John A. Powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 533, 544–45
(1992) (describing Bell’s thesis as full of despair and ignoring significant gains); Jonathan K. Stubbs,
Perceptual Prisms and Racial Realism: The Good News About A Bad Situation , 45 MERCER L. REV.
773, 775–76 (1994) (critiquing Bell’s thesis through the prism of how judicial decisions are made); John
D. Skrentny, Have We Moved Beyond the Civil Rights Revolution? , 123 YALE L.J. 3002, 3010–11
n.36 (2014) [hereinafter Skrentny, Civil Rights Revolution].
31
See Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 27, at 374 ( “Despite our successful effort to strip the law's
endorsement from the hated “Jim Crow” signs, contemporary color barriers are less visible but neither
less real nor less oppressive.”).
32
See id. at 373–74 (“What was it about our reliance on racial remedies that may have prevented us
from recognizing that abstract legal rights, such as equality, could do little more than bring about the
cessation of one form of discriminatory conduct that soon appeared in a more subtle though no less
discriminatory form?”).
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the eternalness of racism is easy; but realizing that the task of undoing centuries of
discrimination is devastating.33 This is all a bit too depressing.
Interestingly, however, Professor Bell seems to slightly change course in his
article and encourages a “resistance to oppression,” but warns that it will reap
minimal results.34 Nonetheless, deep within his soliloquy resides a declaration to
redefine goals of racial equality and opportunity, based on the assumption of the
permanence of racism.

B. Race 2.0.
Conversely, John Skrentny describes a new type of racial realism that is focused
on employment. He proposes that how we think about race has evolved, and that it
has a positive connotation in many respects. He writes:
A [sic] strategy of managing racial difference is what I call racial realism. With
this strategy, employers perceive race as something real and relevant to the
functioning of their workplaces, and believe the effective management of racial
difference can improve organizational operations and (for private employers)
potentially increase profits. My use of the term “realism” here is meant to
emphasize employer perception of the ontological reality of race, rather than the
jurisprudential tradition of legal realism. 35

Skrentny argues that “[t]he goal of racial realists is not equal opportunity or
justice, but organizational effectiveness.”36 He distinguishes his definition from
Professor Bell, and acknowledges that the positions are starkly different.37 Unlike
Professor Bell, Professor Skrentny believes that the use of race, in employment,
law, and politics has usefulness and significance. 38 He points out that in the
political realm, voters use racial realism in choosing candidates,39 and elected
officials also use it to their political advantage.40
33
See id. at 378 (“The Racial Realism that we must seek is simply a hard-eyed view of racism as it is
and our subordinate role in it. We must realize, as our slave forebears, that the struggle for freedom is, at
bottom, a manifestation of our humanity that survives and grows stronger through resistance to
oppression, even if that oppression is never overcome.”).
34
35

See id.

Skrentny, Civil Rights Revolution, supra note 29, at 3010 (citation omitted).
Id. at 3011.
37
Id. at 3010–11 n.36 (“My use of racial realism therefore has little in common with that of Derrick
Bell, who used the same phrase to refer to a philosophy or mentality that saw racial equality as an
unattainable goal in the United States. Bell argued for acknowledgement of the subordinate status for
people of color and skepticism toward civil rights laws and policies.” (citing Bell, Racial Realism, supra
note 27, at 373–74).
38
See generally JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2013) [hereinafter SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS].
39
Skrentny, Civil Rights Revolution, supra note 29, at 3020 (”The People themselves appear to use
racial realism when voting for elected officials . . . Whites tend to elect whites, and nonwhites elect
nonwhites.”) (citation omitted).
40
Id. at 3022 (“Democratic presidents still use racial realism when making appointments, from Bill
Clinton's efforts to have a cabinet that ‘looks like America’ to Barack Obama's strategic appointment of
36
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Skrentny’s model proposes that race and how society views it, in some realms,
has evolved. His position, that racial realism has both usefulness and significance,
challenges notions of race neutrality and race consciousness. In a jurisprudential
sense, law has not evolved at the same pace. While the Supreme Court can
acknowledge that race discrimination in voting continues, it does not offer a
remedy.41 Voting realism is the recognition that race and racism influence the
voting process. Policies that are adopted include this recognition, whether stated or
unstated, or whether they are authorized pursuant to the Elections Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the demise of Section 5 and the new millennium
laws that restrict access to the ballot, such as voter ID and proof of citizenship laws,
mirror Bell’s apocalyptic prophesy and could lead to ultimate despair. Nonetheless,
it is imperative that the work continues and that we begin to think inventively
about not just restoring Section 4, but envisioning a broader reality where
discrimination in voting does not exist, and access to the ballot is unfettered.
Because racism continues to exist in voting laws, 42 one cannot ignore its existence
and hope to cure it without ever providing the proper medication that can heal the
disease. It is imperative that we acknowledge the existence of racism, but it is also
imperative that we not allow that reality to debilitate the quest to overcome it.
While the VRA was and continues to be an extraordinary piece of legislation,
Bell’s critique challenges us to ask for more. The VRA was exceptional in its ability
to level the playing field in many respects. The goal of equality, however, remains
elusive. I do not agree with Professor Bell that this reality requires us to abandon
the quest. Indeed, the act of overcoming necessitates imaginative thinking that
includes accepting that ignoring race will not lead to a comprehensive approach to
mitigate, if not eliminate discrimination from the act of voting.
Voting realism allows legislators to think take into account about what the laws
should be without ignoring the role that racism plays in our society. Voting realism
would argue that instead of restoring Section 4, we should ask how to move beyond
it. Voting realism advocates that the right to vote is fundamental and demands full
protection. It does not run away from racially aware statutes, but seeks to embrace
and improve them. It goes beyond a declaration of equality, addresses systemic
problems, and develops a systematic approach to overcoming the ills of voter
suppression and inequality. This approach suggests that the focus should not limit
“remedies” but begin to think imaginatively about the type of democracy not only
that we currently live in, but the type of democracy that we can aspire to have.

Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court. Yet Republican presidents use racial realism as well . . . .”)
(citations omitted).
41
See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“Our decision in no way affects the
permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in § 2 . . . Our country has

changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the
legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”) (emphasis added).
42
See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013) (“[V]oting discrimination still exists; no
one doubts that.”).
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II. BEING SHELBY COUNTY
In Shelby County, the Supreme Court dared Congress to change the coverage
formula that determined which jurisdictions would be subject to federal oversight
of voting changes under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 43 It had cautioned
Congress that the life of the VRA was subject to execution if it did not act in a
previous case, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder, (NAMUDNO).44 Congress did nothing. In the Shelby County decision,
the Court indicated that it was forced to act stating, “[Congress’s] failure to act
leaves us today with no choice but to declare §4(b) unconstitutional.”45 Further,
the Court posited that the “country has changed” and the formula did not address
“current conditions.”46 While it acknowledged that the VRA is responsible in large
part for increasing voter registration for black voters and the number of minority
elected officials, it essentially proclaimed that enough was enough.47 Essentially, the
Court gave the impression that it viewed Section 5 as medicine for a disease that
was no longer at epidemic proportions while refusing to allow a targeted and
effective remedy to currently infected areas. Thus, a majority of the justices,
without doubt, believed that the “current conditions,” like fewer disparities in voter
registration, for example, merited the removal of all life-sustaining legislation.48 It
challenged Congress to act, but had little appreciation for the historical significance
and modern day usefulness.

43
See id. at 2630–31.(“There is no valid reason to insulate the coverage formula from review merely
because it was previously enacted 40 years ago. If Congress had started from scratch in 2006, it plainly
could not have enacted the present coverage formula. It would have been irrational for Congress to
distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old data, when today's statistics
tell an entirely different story. And it would have been irrational to base coverage on the use of voting
tests 40 years ago, when such tests have been illegal since that time. But that is exactly what Congress
has done. . . . Congress could have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not do so. Its
failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional. The formula in that
section can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.”).
44
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUNDO), 557 U.S. 193
(2009). The Court did so by noting that:

More than 40 years ago, this Court concluded that ‘exceptional conditions’ prevailing in
certain parts of the country justified extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our
federal system. In part due to the success of that legislation, we are now a very different
Nation. Whether conditions continue to justify such legislation is a difficult constitutional
question we do not answer today. We conclude instead that the Voting Rights Act permits all
political subdivisions, including the district in this case, to seek relief from its preclearance
requirements.

Id. at 211 (citation omitted).
45
See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
46
Id.
47
See id. at 2526–28.
48
See id. at 2629 (“Congress did not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage formula
rounded in current conditions.”).
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A. Purpose and Need for the VRA.
We have seen this before. In 1883, the Supreme Court found that the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, which sought to make former slaves full and equal citizens, was
unconstitutional.49 This marked a turning point in the United States’ journey of
becoming a nation where all men were truly created equal. Less than twenty years
after passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, the last African American gave up his
seat in Congress due to disenfranchisement and racial tensions.50 States had
implemented barriers to the franchise, such as literacy tests, grandfather clauses,
and felon disenfranchisement laws.51 It would take seventy years before an African
American would return to Congress from a former Confederate state, and almost a
century from the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment before Congress would
provide the nation with tools to combat massive and violent disenfranchisement in
passing the 1965 VRA.52 This Act was “a response to the ‘unremitting and
ingenious defiance’ of the command of the Fifteenth Amendment for nearly a
century by State officials in certain parts of the Nation.” 53 The VRA is commonly
referred to as “the most successful piece of civil rights legislation ever adopted by
the United States Congress.”54 The dismantling of disenfranchising methods that
had existed almost a century prior to its enactment justifies this title. The historical
import of the Act cannot be overstated. It included two primary provisions:
Sections 5 and 2, each discussed in turn.

1. Section 5—Section 5 of the VRA was enacted to protect the voting process
from historically debilitating race discrimination.55 The VRA was needed in large
part due to the widespread and successful efforts to ban blacks from the ballot.
Mechanisms such as the poll tax, literacy test, and the grandfather clause kept the

49
50

See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 31–32 (1883).

George Henry White, a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives, first
elected in 1896, was the last African American to leave Congress during the period of Reconstruction.
See George H. White (George Henry), (1852-1918), DOCUMENTING THE AM. S.,
http://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/whitegh/bio.html (last updated Mar. 2 2016) .
51
See Rayford W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO: FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO
WOODROW WILSON 212 (First Collier Books ed. 1965) (1954); Steve Mintz, Winning the Vote: A
History
of
Voting
Rights,
GILDER
LEHRMAN
INST.
AM.
HIST.,
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/government-and-civics/essays/winning-vote-historyvoting-rights (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
52
See Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 268 (1982) (explaining that the VRA embodied
Congress’s “firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting”).
53
McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 243 (1984) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 309 (1966)).
54
See, e.g., Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws-1 (last updated Aug. 6, 2015).
55
See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 202 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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rate of voter registration for African Americans at negligible levels.56 The VRA
declared that enough was enough.
Under what was previously Section 5 of the VRA, the submitting jurisdiction
was required to provide to the Attorney General of the United States information
regarding the nature of the change (i.e., the statutory or judicial authority for the
change, copies of the previous ordinance or change, a statement explaining the
reason for the change and an explanation on the anticipated effect on racial or
language minorities in the jurisdiction).57 Section 5 further suggested that
demographic information and evidence of publicizing the change to the community
would assist in its review.58 Accordingly, the VRA banned disenfranchising
mechanisms like the literacy test and poll taxes while institutionalizing federal
oversight in the registration and the procedural context.59
This recognition of the Act’s genesis to prohibit race discrimination is of great
meaning, particularly since efforts to restore the VRA tend to focus on race-neutral
ways to address existing discrimination in voting.60 Contrary to Professor Bell’s
admonition and despite scholarly assertions that the race-conscious method should
be abandoned, ignoring the historical significance and the contemporary effects
that remain calls for a different solution. While race-neutral statutes like the
National Voter Registration Act,61 the Help America Vote Act,62 and the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act63 have made great
progress, the effects of modern day disenfranchising practices and procedures
continue to have a racially discriminatory impact. 64
Since the Shelby County decision, our nation has lacked the vigilant oversight
of the Department of Justice regarding voting changes, particularly in areas that
were known for passing and attempting to implement legislation that infringed on

56

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
UNITED STATES 62–63, 77–80, 84–93 (2000) (documenting myriad efforts to disenfranchise
African Americans and others including poll taxes, literacy tests, violence, and criminal exclusion laws).
Cf. Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–54 (1959) (holding that literacy
tests, if applied equally across all races, did not contravene the Constitution). The VRA subsequently
outlawed literacy tests. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(b) (2014) (suspending tests or devices which deny or abridge
the right to vote).
57
Required Contents, 28 C.F.R. § 51.27 (2015).
IN THE

58
59

See id.

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2014)).
60
See supra Part I.
61
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2012) (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§
20501–11 (2014).
62
Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901−21145 (2014).
63
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301−11 (2014).
64
See, e.g., JODY HERMAN, ET AL., A REVIEW OF ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT 5−6 (Project Vote/Voting for
America, Inc. 2009), http://www.projectvote.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/NVRA-LiteratureReview-FINAL.pdf (finding that discrepancies among implementation of the National Voter
Registration Act disproportionately impacts poor citizens).
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a minority’s right to vote.65 While Section 5 of the VRA had certainly endured
many challenges,66 the most recent challenge in Shelby County thus far seems the
most fatal.67 Although Shelby County did not find Section 5 of the Act
unconstitutional, it obliterated the coverage formula.68 As Justice Ginsburg
observed, “without that formula, § 5 is immobilized.”69 Jurisdictions could
immediately enact voting changes without regard to its impact on voters.
The Shelby County decision invigorated state Attorney Generals’ efforts to
make voting more difficult.70 Indeed in Texas, a few short hours after the Shelby
County decision was announced Attorney General Abbott ordered its voter ID law
effective immediately, despite a court ruling that the law discriminated against
Hispanic and African American voters.71 Since then, a federal court has held that
the Texas voter ID law is intentionally discriminatory, finding that approximately
608,470 registered voters, or 4.5% of all registered voters in Texas, lacked the
requisite ID, and that a disproportionate number of these voters were AfricanAmerican or Hispanic.72 The Fifth Circuit rearticulated the district court’s
findings:
(1) [the voter ID law] specifically burdens Texans living in poverty, who are less
likely to possess qualified photo ID, are less able to get it, and may not otherwise
need it; (2) a disproportionate number of Texans living in poverty are African–
Americans and Hispanics; and (3) African–Americans and Hispanics are more
likely than Anglos to be living in poverty because they continue to bear the
socioeconomic effects caused by decades of racial discrimination.73

65
66

See Ala. Legis. Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1272–74 (2015).
See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 200–01, 211 (2009)

(holding that Section 5 was constitutional, but cautioning Congress regarding the constitutionality of
Section 5 and expanded bail-out provisions); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 317, 337
(1966) (holding that Section 5 of the VRA was constitutional).
67
See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (chastising Congress’ inaction and
finding Section 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional, thus invalidating the formula for determining what
jurisdictions needed preclearance from the federal government). Since the preclearance remedy in VRA
Section 5 is based on the formula in Section 4, the Shelby County decision essentially stripped Section 5
of its power. See id. at 2632 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68
See id. at 2631 (majority opinion).
69
Id. at 2632 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70
See, e.g., League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir.
2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735, (2015) (finding that “North Carolina began pursuing sweeping
voting reform” the day after Shelby County was handed down); Davis v. Abbott, 781 F.3d 207, 212 (5th
Cir. 2015) (“The day after Shelby County came down, on June 26, 2013, then-Governor Rick Perry
signed the bill repealing the 2011 plan, . . . and making the [new Senate] plan immediately effective.”).
71
Sarah Childress, With Voting Rights Act Out, States Push Voter ID Laws , FRONTLINE (June
26, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/with-voting-rights-act-out-states-push-voter-idlaws/.
72
Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 659, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
73
Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 512–13 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 664).
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Notwithstanding these and other findings, Texas implemented its voter ID
requirement in the 2014 midyear election.74 Other jurisdictions making a speedy
transition to a world without Section 5 include North Carolina and Virginia, which
both introduced redistricting plans, while North Carolina also introduced a voter
ID law considered at the time to be the most restrictive in the country.75
The country cannot wait almost a century, as it did between the passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment and the 1965 VRA, before Congress realizes that action is
needed to protect the democratic process, election integrity, and access to the
ballot.

2. Section 2—Although Section 5 was effectively dismantled in the Shelby
County decision, Section 2 of the VRA remains a viable tool to combat
discrimination in voting.76 Courts have noted similarities between the Section 5
and Section 2 inquiries.77 Since Shelby, the primary tool for eradicating voting
discrimination has been Section 2 of the VRA. Section 2, while a powerful tool,
differs from Section 5 in four key ways: it is reactive instead of preemptive;
litigation is more expensive than preclearance; the burden of proof shifts from the
state to the petitioner; and federal oversight and notice.78 Because of Shelby
County, the many voting changes that once were subject to Section 5 preclearance
were now free to be implemented without federal approval or consideration.

74
Texas Attorney General Abbott also pressed forward “redistricting maps legislators drew up in
2011 that ‘show[ed] a deliberate, race-conscious method to manipulate not simply the Democratic vote
but, more specifically, the Hispanic vote,’ according to a court ruling that blocked the maps.” Childress,
supra note 70.
75
See Penda D. Hair, Note to Politicians: Think It’s Open Season on Voters? Think Again! ,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/penda-d-hair/note-topoliticians-think_b_4058275.html; see also Childress, supra note 70. Having previously had voter ID
laws blocked by the Justice Department and the federal courts, South Carolina Attorney General Alan
Wilson called the VRA an ‘extraordinary intrusion’ on its sovereignty,” and said “South Carolina can
now move forward with ‘reasonable election reforms’ including its voter ID law.” Id.
76
See Thompson v. Attorney Gen. of Miss., No. 3:15-CV-620-JEG-DPJ-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL
5254150, at *3–4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 9, 2015).
77
See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 241–42 (4th Cir. 2014)
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735, (2015) (“Further, as the Supreme Court noted, ‘some parts of the
[Section] 2 analysis may overlap with the [Section] 5 inquiry.’ . . . Both Section 2 and Section 5 invite
comparison by using the term ‘abridge[ ].’ Section 5 states that any voting practice or procedure ‘that has
the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States on
account of race or color . . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to
vote.’ Section 2 forbids any ‘standard, practice, or procedure’ that ‘results in a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. . . .’ The Supreme Court
has explained that ‘[t]he term “abridge,” . . . whose core meaning is “shorten,”. . . necessarily entails a
comparison. It makes no sense to suggest that a voting practice “abridges” the right to vote without
some baseline with which to compare the practice.’” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
78
See, e.g., Yeomans, et al., supra note 9, at 3–4. See generally Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished
Business: Protecting Voting Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928
(2013).
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Although Section 2 remains a powerful tool to combat discrimination in voting, it
too is currently under attack.79
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a nationwide prohibition against voting
practices and procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, color or
membership in a language minority group. 80 In the landmark case Thornburg v.
Gingles, the Court reasoned “that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure
interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives.”81 A Section 2 inquiry, then, differs based on the type of alleged
discrimination. In a case challenging a voting configuration, such as a districting
claim or a challenge to a large voting district such as an at-large system, the Court
will not only consider the three Gingles factors (compactness, political
cohesiveness, and legally significant bloc voting), but will also conduct a thorough
assessment of the extent that historical efforts may have caused the vast disparities
between racial minorities and the majority race. 82 In order to successfully show a
Section 2 violation, the petitioner must demonstrate not only the three Gingles
prerequisites, but discrimination under the totality of the circumstances.83 The
Court will also consider the factors set out in the Gingles case, commonly referred
to as the “Senate Factors”84 or the totality of the circumstances analysis. This
79
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Section 2 Is Dead: Long Live Section 2, 160 U. PA L. REV.
219, 220–21, 221 n.8 (2012) (prophesying that the United States Supreme Court could strike down
Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act in the next two to five years.); Roger Clegg & Hans A. von
Spakovsky,“Disparate Impact” and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act , HERITAGE FOUND.: LEGAL
ISSUES (March 17, 2014) at 1, 2 (arguing that it would be unconstitutional to read Section 2 to prohibit
voting practices that have a disparate impact on minority groups, and that section 2 should be read only
to prohibit voting practices with disparate treatment); Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism,
114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2016) (stating that Section 2 is in the crosshairs).
80
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2014)).
81
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
82
See id. at 35–46.
83
Id. at 43.
84
Id. at 44–46. The Senate Factors include:

1. [T]he . . . history of official [voting-related] discrimination in the state or political
subdivision . . . ;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially
polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used . . . voting practices or
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. . . . whether members of the minority group have been denied access to [the candidate
slating processes];
5. the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear the effects of past
discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability
to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterizes by overt or subtle racial appeals; [and]
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in
the jurisdiction.

Id. at 44–45 (footnotes omitted).
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totality assessment allows the court to put the action in context. Reviewers are not
required to find any particular number of the Senate Factors.85
Courts have found two types of cases under Section 2: vote dilution and vote
denial. Vote dilution cases involve the full Gingles analysis, including
demonstrating the ability to draw a majority minority district as part of a remedial
plan and primarily challenge whether her ballot is counted equally as other voters.
In the Gingles analysis, plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the practice or
procedure dilutes the vote and prevents the opportunity to have her vote counted
equally. In a vote denial case, the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate the three
Gingles prerequisites, per se, but the existence of the totality of circumstances. Vote
denial cases are brought to challenge provisions such as felon disenfranchisement,
voter id, demonstrate that the right to cast a ballot or participate equally in the
electoral process has been hindered by the existence of the discriminatory practice
or procedure.
In a recent vote denial case, League of Women Voters of North Carolina v.
North Carolina, the court addressed whether North Carolina’s elimination of same
day registration, as well as out of precinct voting, discriminated against its African
American citizens.86 The court explained that in Section 2 vote denial cases, one
must undergo a two-step process that involves whether the bill imposes a
discriminatory burden,87 and whether a causal link exists.88

B. Fighting the Good Fight.
Since Shelby County, the VRA has been fighting with one arm, unable to block
blows from jurisdictions implementing legislation without federal oversight. In
85

Id. at 45. Under Section 2, “[a] violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens.” 52 U.S.C. §
10301(b) (2014) (emphasis added). Courts make “an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact
of [electoral administration] . . . in the light of past and present reality, political and otherwise” Gingles,
478 U.S. at 78.
86
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735, (2015).
87
Id. at 245. (“There can be no doubt that certain challenged measures in House Bill 589
disproportionately impact minority voters. The district court found that Plaintiffs ‘presented unrebutted
testimony that [African American] North Carolinians have used [same-day registration] at a higher rate
than whites in the three federal elections during which [same-day registration] was offered’ and
recognized that the elimination of same-day registration would ‘bear more heavily on African–
Americans than whites.’”). The district court also “accepted the determinations of Plaintiffs' experts”
that African American voters disproportionately voted out of precinct and that “the prohibition on
counting out-of-precinct provisional ballots will disproportionally affect [African American] voters.” Id.
at 233.
88
Id. at 245 (“Second, we must determine whether this impact was in part ‘caused by or linked to
“social and historical conditions” that have or currently produce discrimination against members of the
protected class.’”) Furthermore, the court must determine whether members of the protected class “have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.” Id. (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
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some instances, after the statute has been implemented and subsequently found to
discriminate against minority voters, the Court has continued to allowed
implementation despite its effect on voting access. Since 2010, twenty-one states
have enacted new laws that tend to make voting more difficult.89 In fact, fifteen
states will have new rules in place affecting the right to vote in the 2016
presidential election.90
Race-neutral laws, like voter ID, continue to have a racial impact. Undeniably,
scholars believe that the voter id laws and other restrictive measures have some
impact on voter turnout. In the 2014 midterm elections, voter turnout was
exceptionally low; the lowest in seventy-two years.91 However, many variables exist
that can affect turnout, such as, weather, quality of candidates, work schedules, etc.
Regarding close elections, however, voter ID and other laws may have attributed to
suppressed turnout. In Texas, Democratic officials believe that the voter ID laws
were part of the reason that the state had some of the lowest voter turnout in the
country.92 In October, a study by the Government Accountability Office found that
voter ID laws contributed to lower voter turnout amongst minorities, young people,
and poor people in the 2012 elections in Kansas and Tennessee. 93
III. ONWARD
As previously discussed, efforts to restore Section 4 are greatly needed, while at
the same time, protecting what remains of the Voting Rights Act is of paramount
importance. In an attempt to respond, a bipartisan group of Congresspersons filed
the Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015 (VRAA),94 which had the stated
purpose of “amend[ing] the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to revise the criteria for
determining which states and political subdivisions are subject to section 4 of the
Act. . . .”95 The VRAA posits a new nationwide coverage formula that would
89
Voting Laws Roundup 2015 , BRENNAN CTR. FOR
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2015.
90

JUST.

(June

3,

2015),

Id.

91

Jose A. DelReal, Voter Turnout in 2014 Was Lowest Since WWII, WASH. POST (Nov. 10,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/11/10/voter-turnout-in-2014was-the-lowest-since-wwii/.
92
Ross Ramsey, Turnout Down in Texas, and Democrats Claim a Reason: Voter ID Laws , N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/us/turnout-down-in-texas-anddemocrats-claim-a-reason-voter-id-law.html.
93
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-634, ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO
STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS 51–52 (2014).
94
Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 2867, 114th Cong. (2015).
95
Id. The coverage formula provides that states are subject to certain requirements if:
(i) 15 or more voting rights violations occurred in the State during the previous 25 calendar
years; or
(ii) 10 or more voting rights violations occurred in the State during the previous 25 calendar
years, at least one of which was committed by the State itself (as opposed to a political
subdivision within the State).
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determine whether a state would be subject to Section 5 preclearance. 96 The act
limits the types of changes that would be subject to preclearance to changes
affecting elections, redistricting, and the qualifications to vote.97 Under these new
criteria, coverage would last for ten years and would cover thirteen states.98
Congress may create legislation that imposes a limit on the states “broad powers
to demine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.” 99
These powers, given to Congress under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, “are to a degree restrictions of State power.”100 While the Elections
Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress the ability to determine
the qualifications of electors,101 states must do so consistent with the guarantees of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments that prohibits states from imposing
qualifications for voting that discriminate on the basis of race, language, or
minority status.102
In his book, After Civil Rights: Racial Realism in the New American
Workplace,103 Skrentny uses the term “racial realism” to refer to the way that race
has changed in society since the passage of another landmark piece of legislation,
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.104 Title VII and the VRA made Jim Crow
level race discrimination illegal. 105 Skrentny posits that although race during the
Jim Crow and Civil Rights eras were used as a mechanism to discriminate and to
negatively impact African Americans, employers often have legitimate, nonracial
reasons for choosing a person of color.106 He argues that America is different in
how we treat race today, and that while many support colorblind classical liberalism

Id. § 4. These criteria would subject Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia to preclearance
requirements. Fact Sheet: Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015 , LAW. COMMITTEE FOR C.R.
UNDER L., http://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/VRAA-Fact-Sheet-2015.pdf
(last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
96
Id. § 4.
97
Id. § 4A.
98
H.R. 2867; Fact Sheet: Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, supra note 93.
99
See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959)).
100
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
101
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
102
See Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966) (upholding Section 4 of the VRA); see also
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 175 (1980) (“[U]nder the Fifteenth Amendment,
Congress may prohibit voting practices that have only a discriminatory effect”).
103
See generally SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 37.
104
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).
105

Id.
See SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 37, at,10–18. Skrentny argues fundamentally
that race in the employment sector has “significance” and “usefulness.” Id. at 10.
106
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and would argue for the elimination of racial classifications, support can also be
found for racial realism and race consciousness.107

A. Voting Realist Approaches.
Likewise, while great gains have been made in the area of voting rights, classical
colorblind liberalism would advocate for a race-neutral approach to this issue that
would ignore racial classifications. However, in the voting rights era, it has been
demonstrated that a race-neutral legislation can have racial effects.108 For example,
the National Voter Registration Act, while race neutral, tremendously increased the
number of persons on the voter rolls.109
Registrations at social services
departments greatly increased minority registrations numbers. Moreover, the need
for race-conscious legislation remains because discrimination based on race
remains. As Professor Bell lamented, laws like the VRA and Title VII, which were
once safe havens, have become relics of the past.110 Yet, instead of discussing
restoration, maybe resurrection is the more appropriate way to consider providing
protection against suppressive and discriminatory practices. Instead of advocating
for the elimination of racial classifications, an alternative focus would be to
completely eliminate discrimination of any kind. Accordingly, the existence of race
discrimination should serve as the appropriate impetus to craft legislation that will
assist in the long held objective.
In this new reality where people of color are making great gains and the
demographics of the electorate are rapidly changing,111 it is imperative that we do
not choose to ignore race, but instead acknowledge it as a consideration in naming
societal wrongs and developing remedies. While Skrentny considers racial realism
as applied to employment law, critical race theorist Derrick Bell first coined the
phrase and defined it as a means to redefine goals of racial equality. 112 Bell’s racial
realism not only acknowledges societal gains, but also argues that today’s barriers
are “less visible but [not] less real nor less oppressive.” 113 Moreover, while Skrentny
107

See id. at 4. Skrentny defines color-blind classical liberalism as the view that “immutable
differences such as race or ancestry should not determine opportunities or outcomes.” Id.
108
Jody Herman et al., A Review of Academic Literature on the Effectiveness of the National Voter
Registration
Act,
PROJECT
VOTE
2
(2009),
http://www.projectvote.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/07/NVRA-Literature-Review-FINAL.pdf.
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asks us to look at race through a twenty-first century lens,114 Bell suggests that we
rely less on racial remedies.115 The answer for voting rights lies in the middle—it is
important to redefine goals of racial equality and develop strategies that
acknowledge difference and the historical and contemporaneous consequences and
address current race based inequities.

1. Thinking Beyond—In a previous article, I advocated for Voter Impact
Statements as a means of providing Section 5-like coverage by utilizing Congress’s
authority under the Elections Clause.116 While a need exists to require legislators
to vet legislation that effects the right to vote prior to passage is sorely needed, in a
post-Shelby County world, perhaps this lacks the requisite imagination that
Professor Bell invoked.117 Skrentny contends that a “gap” exists “between everyday
practice and the law, and that we should consider reforming the law to bring the
two into sync, so as to ensure that we act in accordance with our most fundamental
values.”118 How to fill the gap between those who advocate for race neutrality and
race consciousness is a tall order. However, it is important to remember that the
VRA was a product of the reality of race in America. While the reality present in
1965 was much different from our present day reality, race continues to serve as a
factor in the accumulation of power, wealth, and voting rights in society. To that
end, scholars have suggested the use of the Elections Clause in an effort to align
with the current Supreme Court’s jurisprudential view of race.119 However, the
debate over Elections Clause or Fourteenth Amendment could expand with
consideration over adopting a constitutional amendment that recognizes the
universal need for reform that address racial inequities and eliminates barriers.
Accordingly, a voting realist approach would include advocating for an affirmative
right to vote in the United States Constitution.

114
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2. Right to Vote Amendment—A Right to Vote (RTV) Amendment abolishes
the discussion regarding race conscious versus race neutral approaches to securing
voting rights to eligible citizens and demonstrably illustrates Derrick Bell’s
admonition to think imaginatively. Nonetheless, many Americans are unaware
that the United States Constitution does not contain an affirmative right to vote.
In an effort to think beyond the limits of the Voting Rights Act, an RTV
amendment would secure the fundamental right to all eligible citizens and mitigate,
if not eliminate many of the barriers to voting.120 Accordingly, the Voting Rights
Act nor any other federal legislation includes an explicit right to cast a ballot in an
election. While an effort to restore Section 4 could address any new efforts to
make voting harder, the preexisting conditions would continue to spread the
disease of discrimination in the act of voting, without the salve of an affirmative
right to vote enshrined in the United States Constitution.
While the United States Constitution contains more amendments that address
the right to vote than any other right, 121 it does not, however, contain an
affirmative right to vote. The Supreme Court reminded us in Bush v. Gore,122 “the
individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the
President of the United States.”123 In a democratic society, the ability of the people
to choose its leaders is integral to the political institution. 124 The inability to do so,
makes outcomes suspicious and undermines this fundamental right.125 To grant this
power to other entities, such as the Electoral College, weakens the confidence in
the system and appears suspect.126 Without a precise statement in the United
States Constitution granting, the right to vote is given and taken from groups of
people based on various circumstances, inter alia, mental competency, previous
120
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conviction of a felony, or ability to obtain a required form of identification. An
RTV amendment could serve as a race neutral, innovative and forward thinking
approach to achieving voting realism.
The RTV amendment approach, however, is not without its detractors. Some
scholars question whether an RTV amendment could achieve any tangible results.
127
Most argue that the existing constitutional amendments provide a right to vote
and protects citizens from discrimination.128 This argument, however, tends to
ignore that the act of voting involves thousands of entities across the country to
determine voter eligibility, such as age, residence, citizenship in some states, felon
status, etc. Moreover, just as the constitutional amendment prohibits states from
prohibiting an eighteen year old from voting, an RTV amendment could help ease
the numerous barriers that currently exist. Federal legislators have offered
perennial legislation that offers a RTV amendment.129 Securing the right to vote to
all persons through a constitutional amendment would allow greater access to the
franchise and embolden the idea that the right to vote is indeed fundamental.130
Additionally, an RTV amendment that simply guaranteed citizens an explicit
constitutional right to vote would rise to the level of other protected rights such as
the right to free speech and to practice the religion of your choice. An explicit
right makes it much harder for states to employ divisive tactics that inhibit the
exercise of the franchise. An RTV amendment eliminates the massive differences
in accessing the ballot that occur across the country. The “crazy quilt” of felon
disenfranchisement requirements would no longer exist if the RTV amendment
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granted the right to vote to all citizens.131 A RTV amendment could serve as a big,
bold step towards ensuring that the right to vote is held in high esteem. It could
serve as the first step in creating a process that is free, fair, and accessible to all
Americans. If the country can move towards a system that allows all of its citizens
to participate in the electoral process, the next logical step is to provide a procedure
that places citizens in the posture to access the franchise.
The idea that we must choose between a race-conscious or race-neutral
approach is, as Spencer Overton suggests, a “false choice.”132 To think
imaginatively, as Professor Bell encourages, we must move beyond Section 4 and
onto ideas, such as universal suffrage. A multiplicity of ideas is presently being
offered as options to improve the voting process.133 Professor Bell would posit that
these offerings in the present political climate have little chance of moving
forward.134 Nonetheless, the determination to create fair, free, nondiscriminatory
methods to access the ballot must endure.
CONCLUSION
Race still matters. Race-based solutions can cure race discrimination. Society
does not have to choose between race-neutral and race-conscious solutions.
Though great progress has been made, race discrimination in the area of voting
continues to exist. In spite of the constant reminders that race still matters, we are
bombarded with propaganda that it should not or it does not because we are postracial. When proponents press this argument, they inevitably point to the election
of President Barack Obama. This school of thought leads proponents to believe
that the country no longer has a need for not only racial classifications, but for civil
rights and its protective capacities. The 2016 election with its dog whistle politics
may have convinced former post racial proponents that more work certainly needs
to occur before we are truly free from discrimination. In spite of the election
outcome, most citizens believe in the right to be treated equally and to be free from
discrimination in various settings, including education, employment, housing,
voting, and criminal justice. As previously stated, voting realism requires (1)
acknowledging that race has significance and usefulness, and (2) being more
imaginative in how we achieve racial equality. With this approach, the Voting
Rights Act and the Elections Clause are merely starting points, not where progress
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ends. It is imperative to think broadly about rights, not to narrow our gaze. An
RTV amendment and other innovative measures will help expand the franchise and
hopefully, begin to operate as if the right to vote is truly fundamental.

